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기관투자가의 “수평적 주식보유 (Horizontal Shareholding)”에 대한 경쟁법적 논의
Author
강성진
Journal Title
경쟁법연구
Publication Year
2018
Topics
Summary
This paper analyzes the anti-competitive effects of institutional investors' horizontal shareholding. Problems such as decreased competition incentives and increased possibility of collusion can occur when institutional investors hold shares of competing companies, and the need for regulation is argued. Competition authorities in Korea and other countries should monitor this phenomenon and apply antitrust laws when necessary.
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